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Abstract: The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homo-
geneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked
preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for
each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will nd
acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division
problem when agentsparticipation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic
interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to
propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because oth-
erwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining
agentsshares. We study a subclass of e¢ cient and consistent rules and characterize
extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agentsvoluntary participa-
tion.
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1 Introduction
The division problem consists of a set of agents that have to share an amount of an
homogeneous and perfectly divisible good. Each agent has single-peaked preferences on
the set of his potential shares; namely, there is an amount of the good (the peak of the
agent) that is his most-preferred share and in both sides of the peak the preference is
monotonic, decreasing at its right and increasing at its left. Since preferences reect
idiosyncratic characteristics of the agents, they have to be elicited by a rule that maps
each division problem (a set of agents, a preference prole of declared list of single-peaked
preferences, one for each agent, and the amount of the good to be allocated) into a vector
of shares. But in general, the sum of the peaks will be either larger or smaller than the
total amount to be allocated. A positive or negative rationing problem emerges depending
on whether the sum of the peaks exceeds or falls short the xed amount. Rules di¤er
from each other in how this rationing problem is resolved in terms of incentives, e¢ ciency,
fairness, monotonicity, consistency, etc.
There are many examples of allocation problems that t with this general description.
For instance, a group of agents participate in an activity that requires a xed amount of
labor (measured in units of time). Agents have a maximal number of units of time to
contribute and consider working as being undesirable. Suppose that labor is homogeneous
and the wage is xed. Then, strictly monotonic and quasi-concave preferences on the set
of bundles of money and leisure generate single-peaked preferences on the set of potential
shares where the peak is the amount of working time associated to the optimal bundle.
Similarly, a group of agents join a partnership to invest in a project (an indivisible bond
with a face value, for example) that requires a xed amount of money (neither more nor
less). Their risk attitudes and wealth induce single-peaked preferences on the amount to
be invested. In both cases, it is required that a rule solves the rationing problem arising
from a vector of peaks that do not add up the needed amount.
However, in many applications (like those described above), agentsparticipation can
not be compulsory. For instance, to participate agents may have to pay a xed cost or a
fee which could make smaller and larger shares  the less preferred ones given their single-
peaked preferences  unacceptable. Then, each agent will have an interval of acceptable
shares whose elements are preferred to opt out. Therefore, the rule can not propose
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unacceptable shares to agents. In this paper we study rules that solve the rationing problem
when agents participation is voluntary. We call an allocation problem of this type, a
division problem with voluntary participation (a problem, for short). Now, in a problem each
agents preferences are characterized by an interval of acceptable shares where preferences
are single-peaked. Only shares inside this interval are considered to be acceptable. A
rule will have to propose, for each problem, a vector where each agent either does not
participate or else receives an acceptable share. Consequently, the vector where no agent
participates (and the good is disposed of completely) is a feasible allocation. Hence, our
model applies to situations involving a perfectly divisible good that can either be disposed
of completely or be allocated completely.
In a related paper Cantala (2004) considers agentsvoluntary participation in the public
good counterpart of the division problem with single-peaked preferences. He studies a
model in which each agent can opt out from consuming the public good if its chosen
level falls outside of his set of acceptable levels. An important di¤erence between Cantala
(2004) and our private good model is that when an agent opts out and does not consume
the public good, the level of the public good may remain unchanged while in the private
good case the shares of some of the remaining agents have to be redened.
We are interested in rules that satisfy a set of desirable properties. First, e¢ ciency. A
rule is e¢ cient if it always selects Pareto optimal allocations. E¢ ciency guarantees that
in solving the rationing problem (either positive or negative) no amount of the good is
wasted. Second, consistency. A rule is consistent if the proposed shares at a given problem
coincide with the shares that the rule would propose at any smaller problem obtained after
that a subset of agents, agreeing with the amounts the rule has assigned to them, leave
the society taking with them their already assigned shares. Consistency guarantees that,
in order to follow the rules prescription at the reduced problem, the remaining agents
do not have to reallocate their shares. Third, individual rationality from equal division.
Suppose that we assign to each agent his smallest acceptable share. The rest is divided
as equally as possible under the condition that no agent receives more than his largest
acceptable share. A rule satises this property by choosing a Pareto improvement from
the previous allocation.1 Individual rationality from equal division embeds to the rule a
minimal egalitarian principal only broken for two reasons. First, to keep binding the re-
strictions derived from the requirement that agents have to receive acceptable shares and
second, to admit Pareto improvements from this egalitarian allocation. In contrast with
1See Sönmez (1994) for an analysis of rules satisfying this property in the context of division problems
with compulsory participation.
2
the division problem when all shares are acceptable,2 we show that when agentspartici-
pation is voluntary the fundamental properties of strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, anonymity
and one-sided resource-monotonicity are incompatible. Specically, there is no rule satis-
fying strategy-proofness. Besides, e¢ ciency is also incompatible with either anonymity or
one-sided resource-monotonicity. In Subsection 3.2 we give formal proofs of these incom-
patibilities.3 We proceed by leaving aside incentive issues and by focusing on the class of
e¢ cient and consistent rules that are individually rational from equal division.
Before moving to the general description of our results we want to stress a fundamental
attribute of rules when applied to division problems with voluntary participation. Fix a
problem (a set of agents, their preferences, and the amount of the good to be allocated). A
rule has to make two choices. First, it has to select a subset of agents (a coalition) among
whom the good will be allocated. This coalition has to be admissible for the problem: it
should be possible to allocate the total amount of the good among its members without
violating their participation constraints. Second, and given this chosen coalition (if non-
empty), the rule has to select (among potentially many) a particular share allotted to
each of its members. When participation is compulsory rules disregard the rst issue and
always select the grand coalition. In this setting the uniform rule has emerged as the most
appealing one.4 At each division problem with compulsory participation the uniform rule
tries to allocate the amount of the good among all agents as equally as possible, keeping
the e¢ ciency constraints binding. Hence, all agents are constrained in the same way; i.e.,
all agents receive either a share below their peaks (when the sum of all their ideals is larger
than the total amount) or a share above their peaks (when the sum of all their ideals is
smaller than the total amount).
Our results axiomatically identify three nested classes of rules. In all cases the set
of axioms will single out a unique way of allocating the amount of the good among the
members of an admissible chosen coalition. The classes will di¤er precisely on how their
elements choose the admissible coalition. This unique allotting way consists of the following
natural extension of the uniform rule. Fix a problem. If the empty coalition is the unique
2In this setting Sprumont (1991) characterizes the uniform rule as the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency,
anonymity (the names of the agents do not play any role), and strategy-proofness (truth-telling is a
dominant strategy in the direct revelation game induced by the rule).
3In contrast again, Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) shows that when agentsparticipation is com-
pulsory the class of strategy-proof and e¢ cient rules is extremely large.
4See Ching (1992, 1994), Schummer and Thomson (1997), Sönmez (1994), Sprumont (1991), Thomson
(1994a, 1995, 1997), and Weymark (1999) for alternative characterizations of the uniform rule in the
division problem. In the surveys on strategy-proofness of Barberà (1996, 2001 and 2010), Jackson (2001)
and Sprumont (1995) the division problem and the uniform rule plays a prominent role.
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admissible one, no agent participates. Otherwise, take the chosen non-empty admissible
coalition. Then, the allocation of the good among its members can be described as a two
step procedure. First, assign to each agent in the coalition his smallest acceptable share.
The remainder is assigned by adding uniformly the same amount to every agent in the
coalition. If the sum of the peaks exceeds the amount to be allocated then the rule stops
adding to those agents whose peak is reached, and keeps adding uniformly to the rest.
Observe that in this case the remainder will eventually be exhausted before all peaks are
reached. If the sum of the peaks is smaller than the amount to be allocated then the rule
also keeps adding uniformly to all agents, and stops adding only to those agents whose
largest acceptable share is reached, and keeps adding uniformly to the rest. Observe now
that since the coalition was admissible the remainder will eventually be exhausted before
reaching all largest acceptable shares. We call any rule satisfying this allotment procedure
an extended uniform rule. There are many because at many problems there are many
admissible coalitions. Hence, extended uniform rules di¤er only on the choice of the subset
of agents among whom the amount of the good is allocated.
Theorem 1 characterizes the class of e¢ cient, consistent and individually rational from
equal division rules as the subset of extended uniform rules that select the admissible
coalition by choosing coherently the full set of agents whenever it is possible. Theorem 2
characterizes the subclass of rules that, in addition to the previous properties, satisfy an
independence of irrelevant alternatives like property (that we call independence of irrelevant
coalitions). This class consists of the subset of extended uniform rules that at each problem
choose the admissible coalition by maximizing a given monotonic order on the set of all
nite coalitions. Theorem 3 characterizes the smaller subclass of rules that in addition to
e¢ ciency, consistency, and individually rationality form equal division also satisfy order
priority with respect to a given order among individual agents. This class consists of the
subset of extended uniform rules that at each problem choose the admissible coalition by
selecting lexicographically according to the given order. We also show that in all three
characterizations the axioms are independent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3
we dene several properties that a rule may satisfy and show some basic incompatibilities
among them. In Section 4 we dene extended uniform rules. In Section 5 we present
the main results of the paper. In Section 6 we conclude with a discussion and some nal
remarks. Three appendices at the end of the paper collect the proofs of the three theorems.
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2 The model
Let t > 0 be a xed amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good. A nite set of
agents is considering the possibility of dividing t among a subset of them, to be determined
according to their preferences. Since we will be considering situations where the amount of
the good t and the nite set of agents may vary, let N be the set of positive integers and let
N be the family of all non-empty and nite subsets of N. The set of agents is then N 2 N
with cardinality n. In contrast with Sprumont (1991), we consider situations where each
agent has the right to opt out of the division problem. A feasible allocation is that no agent
participates and the good is not divided at all. Observe that we are considering a perfectly
divisible good that can either be disposed of completely or be allocated completely. We
denote by NP the alternative of not participating. Thus, and since each agent i can not be
forced to receive an unacceptable share of the good, his preferencesi are dened on the set
fNPg[ [li; ui], where [li; ui]  [0;+1] is agent is interval of acceptable shares. We assume
that i is a complete, reexive, and transitive binary relation on fNPg[ [li; ui]. Given i
leti be the antisymmetric binary relation induced byi (i.e., for all xi; yi 2 fNPg[[li; ui],
xi i yi if and only if yi  xi does not hold) and let i be the indi¤erence relation induced
by i (i.e., for all xi; yi 2 fNPg [ [li; ui], xi i yi if and only if xi i yi and yi  xi). We
will also assume that i is single-peaked on [li; ui] and we will denote by pi 2 [li; ui] agent
is peak. Formally, agent is preferences i is a complete preorder on the set fNPg[ [li; ui]
that satises the following additional properties:
(P.1) there exists pi 2 [li; ui] such that pi i xi for all xi 2 [li; ui]nfpig;
(P.2) xi i yi for any pair of shares xi; yi 2 [li; ui] such that either yi < xi  pi or
pi  xi < yi;
(P.3) xi i NP for all xi 2 (li; ui);
(P.4) if 0 < ui < +1 then li i ui; and
(P.5) if ui = +1 then li i xi for all xi > li.
A motivation for this kind of preferences is the following. Let agent is preferences
be single-peaked and continuous on [0;+1) : Now we add the option NP to [0;+1) and
there exist li; ui with xi is strictly preferred to NP for all xi 2 (li; ui) : The properties
(P.1)-(P.5) are readily veried.
Observe that agent is preferences are independent of t and are dened on the set
fNPg [ [li; ui]; which will also be considered private information when we dene rules on
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the set of proles. Conditions (P.1) and (P.2) state that i is single-peaked on [li; ui].
Condition (P.3) follows from single-peakedness on [li; ui] and the desirability of acceptable
shares. Conditions (P.4) and (P.5) allow to interpret the interval of acceptable shares [li; ui]
as a truncation of an original single-peaked preference on [0;+1), where the truncation
arises from the fact that agents may opt out (as in Cantala (2004)). In particular, (P.4)
and (P.5) help to give sense to this truncation interpretation. Nevertheless, all our results
also hold in the domain of preferences satisfying (P.1), (P.2), and (P.3).5 Note that the
domain of preferences satisfying conditions (P.1)-(P.5) is large because we are admitting
several possibilities. First, that agent i only has one acceptable share (i.e., li = pi = ui).6
Second, that li > 0 to reect the case where to receive a positive share agents may have to
incur with a (potentially small) cost; for example, the cost of writing a contract specifying
the share of an indivisible bond or a lottery ticket that each agent is entailed to. Third,
that agent i perceives NP as receiving indeed the 0 share (in which case NP i li if li = 0).
Fourth, that li i NP and ui i NP to admit the case that opting out were (perhaps
lexicographically) worse for the agent than staying and getting either li or ui. Although we
do not require any utility representation of agentspreferences, Figure 1 illustrates three
possible preferences (represented by utility functions) satisfying properties (P.1)-(P.5).
Insert Figure 1 here
From a preference i of agent i we can associate a unique triple (li; pi; ui). There are
many preferences of agent i with the same (li; pi; ui); however, they di¤er only on how two
shares on di¤erent sides of pi are ordered while all of them coincide on the ordering on
the shares on each of the sides of pi. A prole N= (i)i2N is an n tuple of preferences
satisfying properties (P.1), (P.2), (P.3), (P.4), and (P.5) above. Given a prole N and
agent is preferences 0i we denote by (0i;Nnfig) the prole where i has been replaced
by 0i and all other agents have the same preferences. When no confusion arises we denote
the prole N by .
A division problem with voluntary participation (a problem for short) is a triple (N;; t)
where N is the set of agents,  is a prole and t is the amount of the good to be divided.
Let P be the set of all problems. A situation where for all agents their participation is
compulsory and preferences are single-peaked on [0;+1) is known as the division problem
5In this larger domain we could admit preferences i with the property that pi i li = 0 i ui or
pi = li = 0 i ui.
6The use of these degenerated preferences simplies some proofs although our results would still hold
if we require that li < ui (see the last section for a comment on this issue).
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(see Ching and Serizawa (1998)).
Let  be a prole. Dene X()  Q
i2N
(fNPg [ [li; ui]): Observe that the set X()
depends on the prole  since, for each agent i 2 N , the set fNPg [ [li; ui] is where is
preferences are dened. For each x 2 X() denote the subset of agents that participate
(and receive an acceptable share) by S(x) = fi 2 N j xi 2 [li; ui]g: Then, the set of feasible
allocations of problem (N;; t) is
FA (N;; t) =
n
x 2 X() j if S(x) 6= ? then Pj2S(x) xj = to :
Again, free disposal of the good is binary in the sense that either t is completely divided
or it is not divided at all. Consequently, the set of feasible allocations is never empty
since the allocation x = (NP; :::; NP ) 2 X() is always feasible (S(x) = ?). Moreover,
there are problems for which (NP; :::; NP ) is the unique feasible allocation; for instance
the problem (N;; t) where N = f1; 2g; t = 10; and 1 and 2 are characterized by
(l1; p1; u1) = (l2; p2; u2) = (1; 2; 3).
A coalition S  N is admissible (at prole  and amount t) if it is either empty or it is
possible to divide t among the agents in S according to their preferences; namely, coalition
S 6= ? is admissible at (N;; t) if there exists x 2 FA(N;; t) such that S(x) = S: It
is obvious that S 6= ? is admissible if and only if Pj2S lj  t  Pj2S uj: We denote by
AC (N;; t) the set of all admissible coalitions at (N;; t). Namely,
AC (N;; t) = fS  N j S is admissible at (N;; t)g :
Observe that AC(N;; t) is never empty because it always contains the empty coalition.
A rule f assigns to each problem in P a feasible allocation in such a way that f
selects (NP; :::; NP ) at (N;; t) if and only if the empty coalition is the unique admissible
coalition at (N;; t); that is, f(N;; t) 2 FA (N;; t) for all (N;; t) 2 P and f(N;
; t) = (NP; :::; NP ) if and only if AC (N;; t) = f?g:7 Hence, a rule f can be seen as a
systematic way of assigning to each (N;; t) 2 P the two di¤erent aspects of the solution
of the problem. First, the admissible coalition S 2 AC(N;; t): If S 6= ? we denote it by
cf (N;; t) = fi 2 N j fi (N;; t) 2 [li; ui]g.
7Note that we are requiring that, at any problem (N;; t) for which there exists a non-empty coalition
S 2 AC(N;; t), (NP; :::; NP ) is not selected by f . Since we will only be interested on e¢ cient rules, this
requirement will become relevant only when t is equal to the sum of left or upper bounds of all non-empty
and admissible coalitions. To require that only in this case (i.e., when e¢ ciency does not discriminate
between the empty and the non-empty admissible coalitions) the rule selects a non-empty coalition is for
technical reasons since it allows the use of easier arguments in some of the proofs.
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Obviously, if i =2 cf (N;; t) then fi(N;; t) = NP . Second, how the amount t is divided
among the members of cf (N;; t); i.e.,P
j2cf (N;;t) fj (N;; t) = t:
We will later see that to identify rules satisfying appealing properties we may have some
freedom when choosing one among the set of admissible coalitions while the properties will
determine a unique way of dividing the amount of the good.
3 Properties of rules
3.1 Denitions
In this subsection we dene several properties that a rule may satisfy.
Rules require each agent to report a preference. A rule is strategy-proof if it is always
in the best interest of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully; namely, it induces
truth-telling as a dominant strategy in the direct revelation game generated by the rule.
Given a problem (N;N ; t) we say that agent i 2 N manipulates f at prole N via 0i if
fi
 
N;
 0i;Nnfig ; t i fi (N;N ; t).
(Strategy-proofness) A rule f is strategy-proof if no agent can manipulate it at any
prole.
A rule is anonymous if it only depends on the characteristics of the prole and not on
the name of the agents having the corresponding preference; that is, it is invariant with
respect to the index given to the agents. Let N 2 N be a set of agents, N : N ! N be a
one-to-one mapping, and N be a prole. Dene the prole N(N)  (N (i))i2N .
(Anonymity) A rule f is anonymous if for any N 2 N , any one-to-one mapping N :
N ! N and any problem (N;N ; t), fi (N;N ; t) = fN (i) (N; N(N); t) for all i 2 N .
A rule is e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto optimal allocation.
(Efficiency) A rule f is e¢ cient if for each problem (N;; t) there is no feasible allo-
cation (yj)j2N 2 FA(N;; t) with the property that yi i fi (N;; t) for all i 2 N and
yj j fj (N;; t) for some j 2 N:
Another property a rule may satisfy is related to its behavior when the amount t to
be shared changes. One-sided resource-monotonicity only imposes conditions on the rule
whenever the change of the amount to be shared does not change the sign of the rationing
problem: if the good is scarce, an increase of the amount to be shared should make all
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agents better o¤ and if the good is too abundant, a decrease of the amount to be shared
should make all agents better o¤.8
(One-sided Resource-monotonicity) A rule satises one-sided resource-monotonicity
if for all two problems (N;; t) ; (N;; t0) 2 P with the property that either t  t0 P
i2N pi or
P
i2N pi  t0  t then fi (N; u;; t0) i fi (N; u;; t) for all i 2 N:
A rule is consistent if the following requirement holds. Apply the rule to a given problem
and assume that a subset of agents leave with their corresponding shares. Consider the
new problem formed by the set of agents that remain with the same preferences that they
had in the original problem and the total amount of the good minus the sum of the shares
received by the subset of agents that already left. Then, the rule does not require to
reallocate the shares of the remaining agents.
(Consistency) A rule f is consistent if for each problem (N;N ; t), each non-empty
subset of agents S  N; and each i 2 S,
fi (N;N ; t) = fi

S;S; t 
P
j2cf (N;N ;t)nS fj (N;N ; t)

:
For the division problem with compulsory participation Sönmez (1994) proposed the
principle of individual rationality from equal division. A rule f is individually rational from
equal division if all agents receive a share that is at least as good as the equal division
share; namely, for each division problem (N;; t),
fi (N;; t) i t
n
for all i 2 N . In a division problem equal division is always feasible but often is not
e¢ cient. Precisely, this principle tries to make compatible equal division with e¢ ciency
by allowing for Pareto improvements from the equal division share. Observe that in our
setting the allocation ( t
n
; :::; t
n
) may not be feasible and/or there may not even exist a
vector of shares at which all agents are better o¤ than at equal division. Thus, when
agentsparticipation is voluntary, this property is too strong (no rule satises it) and it
can not be applied directly. However, and since we think that its content is appealing
we suggest to use the same principle as follows. Assume that in the problem (N;; t)
the coalition N is admissible. Preliminarily assign to each agent i the amount li (which is
possible since N is admissible). The remaining amount t Pj2N lj has still to be allocated,
but again, by feasibility, each agent i must receive overall at most ui: Then, allocate the
8See Thomson (1994b) and Sönmez (1994) for a discussion of one-sided resource monotonicity and
axiomatic characterizations using this property.
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remaining amount t  Pj2N lj as equally as possible, but making sure that no agent i
receives additionally more than ui   li: Each agent must receive a share at least as good
as the previous allocation. Formally,
(Individual Rationality from Equal Division) A rule f is individual rational from
equal division if for each problem (N;; t) for which N is an admissible coalition,
fi (N;; t) i li +min f; ui   lig
for all i 2 N , where  2 R satises Pj2N min f; uj   ljg = t Pj2N lj:9
The next two properties refer explicitly on how the rule chooses the admissible coalition.
A rule satises independence of irrelevant coalitions if the following requirement holds.
Consider two problems where the set of admissible coalitions of the rst one is contained
in the set of admissible coalitions of the second one. Assume that the coalition chosen by
the rule in the second problem is admissible for the rst one. Then, the rule chooses the
same coalition in the two problems. As in many other settings, this principle adopts a
revealed preference point of view: if something is chosen in a set (and thus, it is revealed
as being as preferred to all other alternatives in that set) and the set becomes smaller but
still contains what has been chosen, the new choice should not change.
(Independence of irrelevant coalitions) A rule f satises independence of irrele-
vant coalitions if for any two problems (N;; t) and (N 0;0; t0) such that AC (N 0;0; t0) 
AC (N;; t) and cf (N;; t) 2 AC (N 0;0; t0) then,
cf (N 0;0; t0) = cf (N;; t) :
An order  is a one-to-one mapping  : N  ! N. A rule satises order priority with
respect to  if agent i has more rights to be in the coalition sharing t than any agent that
goes after him according to .10 Namely,
(Order Priority) A rule f satises order priority with respect to  if for each problem
(N;; t) such that i =2 cf (N;; t) and cf (N;; t)\fj 2 N j (j) > (i)g 6= ? then, there
is no admissible coalition containing (fig [ fj 2 N j (j) < (i)g) \ cf (N;; t).
9Note that in the division problem with compulsory participation our version of the principle says
that fi(N;; t) i tn for all i 2 N . Observe that in the voluntary participation context there are other
alternative and natural ways of formalizing the idea of individual rationality from equal division. In Section
6 we describe the one that uses as reference allotment the one obtained by starting at the vector of upper
bounds decreases uniformly agentsshares as long as lower bounds are not reached.
10Priority rules appear in many settings where to treat agents equally is unfeasible. This very asymmetric
rules are still interesting because they can be used to achieve ex-ante symmetry by choosing random
mechanisms whose supports are priority rules.
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Remark 1 Let  be an order and assume that f satises order priority with respect to
: Then, f satises independence of irrelevant coalitions.
3.2 Some basic incompatibilities
Proposition 1 below shows that strategy-proofness is a very strong requirement when
agents participation is voluntary. The reason is that the rule has to depend not only
on the agentspeaks but also on their intervals of acceptable shares; this makes it too vul-
nerable to manipulation. Thus, there is no strategy-proof rule. Furthermore, Proposition
1 also states that e¢ ciency is incompatible with either anonymity or one-sided resource-
monotonicity.
Proposition 1
(1.1) There is no strategy-proof rule.
(1.2) There is no e¢ cient and anonymous rule.
(1.3) There is no e¢ cient and one-sided resource-monotonic rule.
Proof To prove (1.1) let N = f1; 2g be the set of agents, t = 10 and consider any prole
= (1;2) with (l1; p1; u1) = (l2; p2; u2) = (4; 6; 9): Since the only admissible coalition
is N , N is chosen. Thus, either f1 (N;; t) < 6 or f2 (N;; t) < 6: Assume, for instance,
that f1 (N;; t) < 6: Now let agent 1 report any preference 01 with (l01; p01; u01) = (6; 6; 6):
In the problem (N; (01;2) ; t), N is the only admissible coalition and hence N is chosen.
Since the only feasible allocation is (6; 4) ; f1 (N; (01;2) ; t) = 6 1 f1 (N;; t) ; which
means that f is not strategy-proof.
To prove (1.2), let N = f1; 2g be the set of agents, t = 10 and consider any prole
= (1;2) with (li; pi; ui) = (8; 9; 10) for i = 1; 2. Since AC(f1; 2g;; 10) 6= f?g,
f(f1; 2g;; 10) 6= (NP;NP ). Hence, either f(f1; 2g;; 10) = (NP; 10) or f(f1; 2g;
; 10) = (10; NP ); which means that f is not anonymous.
To prove (1.3), let (N;; t) be such that N = f1; 2; 3g ; (li; pi; ui) = (5; 6; 8) for all
i 2 N; and t = 12: By e¢ ciency, two agents receive 6 and the other agent receives 0:
Assume without loss of generality that f (N;; t) = (6; 6; 0) : Let (N;; t0) be such that
t0 = 15: By e¢ ciency, two general cases are possible. First, agent i1 receives x; agent
i2 receives 15   x, and agent i3 receives 0; in which case f violates one-sided resource-
monotonicity because agent 1 or agent 2 receives a share that is strictly worst than 6:
Second, each agent receives 5, in which case f violates one-sided resource-monotonicity
because agents 1 and 2 are strictly worst o¤. 
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4 The uniform rule and some of its extensions
The uniform rule (Sprumont, 1991) has played a central role in the division problem with
compulsory participation because it is the unique rule satisfying di¤erent sets of desirable
properties. For instance, Sprumont (1991) shows that the uniform rule is the unique rule
satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency and anonymity.
The uniform rule U is dened as follows: for each division problem (N;; t) and for
each i 2 N ,
Ui (N;; t) =
(
min f; pig if
P
j2N pj  t
max f; pig if
P
j2N pj < t;
where  is the unique number satisfying
P
j2N Uj (N;; t) = t: Namely, U tries to allocate
the good as equally as possible, keeping the e¢ cient constraints binding: if
P
j2N pj  t
then Ui (N;; t)  pi for all i 2 N , and if
P
j2N pj < t then Ui (N;; t)  pi for all i 2 N .
Observe that when applied to division problems with voluntary participation U is not
a rule since at some problems it may choose non-feasible allocations. In the rest of this
section we extend the uniform rule to our environment. We do it in two steps. First,
we extend the uniform rule only to the subclass of problems where the grand coalition is
admissible and the lower bounds of agentsintervals of acceptable shares are equal to zero.
Let (N;; t) be a problem with the properties that N 2 AC (N;; t) and li = 0 for all
i 2 N . Then, dene F at (N;; t) as follows: for all i 2 N ,
Fi (N;; t) =
(
min f; pig if
P
j2N pj  t
min fmax f; pig ; uig if
P
j2N pj < t;
where  is the unique number satisfying
P
j2N Fj (N;; t) = t:Notice that when
P
j2N pj 
t (the upper bounds of the participation intervals do not play any role) F coincides with
the uniform rule. When
P
j2N pj < t some of the upper bounds may be binding, so F
makes sure that, for all i 2 N , max f; pig is never larger than ui.
But F is not a rule itself because it only applies to a subclass of problems. To dene
a rule f that extends the egalitarian principle behind the uniform rule (by keeping the
bounds imposed by e¢ ciency and voluntary participation), select for each problem (N;; t)
an admissible coalition. If the empty set is the unique admissible coalition at (N;; t) ; set
fi(N;; t) = NP for all i 2 N: Otherwise, let cf (N;; t) be the (non-empty) admissible
coalition (chosen by f) among whom t is allocated in two steps.11 First, preliminarily
11Remember that for a given problem there may be many admissible coalitions; hence, to fully describe
the rule f we will have to specify how cf (N;; t) is chosen by f . But we will deal with this selection later
on.
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assign to each agent in the chosen coalition cf (N;; t) the lower bound of his interval of
acceptable shares, and then apply the rule F to the adjusted problem where the set of
agents is cf (N;; t) and their preferences are 0 normalized. Formally, let (N;; t) be a
problem and let S be one of its non-empty admissible coalitions. The adjusted problem
(S; (lj)j2S; t  
P
j2S lj) is the problem where S is the set of agents, and for each i 2 S,
li is characterized by the triple (0; pi   li; ui   li) and given any pair xi; yi 2 [0; ui   li],
xi li yi if and only if xi+ li i yi+ li; i.e., li translates i to the left by substracting li:12
(Extended Uniform Rule) We say that f is an extended uniform rule if for all (N;
; t) 2 P and all i 2 N; fi (N;; t) = NP whenever AC (N;; t) = f?g and otherwise,
fi(N;; t) =
(
li + Fi

cf (N;; t) ;  ljj2cf (N;;t) ; t Pj2cf (N;;t) lj if i 2 cf (N;; t)
NP if i =2 cf (N;; t) ;
where cf (N;; t) 2 AC (N;; t) and cf (N;; t) 6= ?.
Observe again that there are many problems with more than one admissible coalition
and hence, there are many extended uniform rules. We exhibit an example of a rule in
this family by describing a procedure to select, for each problem, an admissible coalition:
This procedure is based on the idea of selecting the admissible coalition by given priority
to agents according to a xed order :
To roughly describe the procedure assume momentarily thatN = f1; :::; ng and (i) = i
for all i 2 N . If the empty coalition is the unique admissible coalition at (N;; t) then,
choose the empty coalition and the rule assigns NP to each agent. If there are non-empty
admissible coalitions at (N;; t) preselect rst those coalitions containing agent 1; if there
are several, keep only those containing also agent 2, and so on. If there are no admissible
coalitions containing agent 1, preselect those coalitions containing agent 2; if there are
several, keep only those containing also agent 3, and so on.
The formal denition is recursive and depends on the one-to-one mapping  : N  ! N.
Given N 2 N and 1  k  n let (abusing a bit the notation)  1(k)  i be the agent in N
such that jfj 2 N j (j)  (i)gj = k; namely,  1(1) is the agent that goes rst according
to the order ; and in general, for 1  k  n,  1(k) is the agent that has exactly k   1
agents before him according to . Thus, given , we dene the extended uniform rule F 
as follows. If AC(N;; t) = f?g then set F i (N;; t) = NP for all i 2 N . Assume now
that the set of admissible coalitions AC(N;; t) for problem (N;; t) contains at least one
non-empty coalition.
12See Herrero and Villar (2000) for general translations of preferences used to dene the axiom of
Agenda-independence.
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 Stage 0 (initialization): Given AC(N;; t); set X0  AC(N;; t) and go to Stage 1.
 Stage 1 (denition of X1): Given X0; the output of Stage 0.
1. If for each S 2 X0;  1(1) =2 S then, set X1  X0 and go to Stage 2.
2. If there exists S 2 X0 such that  1(1) 2 S then, setX1  fS 2 X0 j  1(1) 2 Sg
and go to Stage 2.
 Stage k (denition of Xk): Given Xk 1, the output of Stage k   1.
1. If for each S 2 Xk 1;  1(k) =2 S then, set Xk  Xk 1 and go to Stage k + 1:
2. If there exists S 2 Xk 1 such that  1(k) 2 S then, setXk  S 2 Xk 1 j  1(k) 2 S	
and go to Stage k + 1.
The procedure stops at Stage n with Xn  Xn(N;; t) having a unique coalition.
Observe that Xn(N;; t) 2 AC(N;; t): Then, the  extended uniform rule F  is the
extended uniform rule such that, for each (N;; t) 2 P, F i (N;; t) = NP for all i 2 N
whenever AC(N;; t) = f?g and cF (N;; t) = Xn(N;; t) otherwise.
5 Results
We are now ready to describe and state the main results of the paper. They axiomatically
identify three nested subclasses of extended uniform rules. All of them use the same
principle to allocate the amount of the good (the same one used by the uniform rule for
division problems with compulsory participation) but di¤er on how to select the admissible
coalition. The larger class imposes only two restrictions on the choice of the admissible
coalition. First, it chooses the full set of agents whenever it is admissible. Second, it
chooses the coalition coherently. The three axioms characterizing this class are e¢ ciency,
consistency and individual rationality from equal division. The intermediate class consists
of those extended uniform rules that choose the admissible coalition according to a priority
relation among all groups of agents that comes from a given monotonic order. This priority
ordering on N has to be monotonic in a double sense. First, adding an agent to a given
set gives priority to the larger set. Second, if a set S has priority over a set T then the
priority is maintained after adding a player i =2 S [ T to both sets. This class is identied
by the same axioms characterizing the larger class plus the property of independence of
irrelevant coalitions. Finally, the smaller class consists of those extended uniform rules that
choose the admissible coalition according to an order  on N that gives priority directly to
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agents; namely, it is the class of all  extended uniform rules that have been dened in the
previous section. This class consists of all e¢ cient, consistent, and individually rational
from equal division rules that satisfy order priority with respect to some : We now turn
to the formal statements of the three results.
Theorem 1 characterizes all e¢ cient, consistent, and individually rational from equal
division rules as a subclass of extended uniform rules.
Theorem 1 Let f be a rule. Then, f is e¢ cient, consistent, and individually rational
from equal division if and only if f is an extended uniform rule with the properties that,
for all (N;; t) 2 P,
(1.a) cf (N;; t) = N when N is an admissible coalition at (N;; t).
(1.b) cf

S;S; t 
P
i2cf (N;;t)nS fi (N;; t)

= cf (N;; t) \ S for each S  N:
Proof See Appendix 1.
There are many extended uniform rules that are ine¢ cient, inconsistent and do not
satisfy individual rationality from equal division because the choice of the admissible coali-
tion may be extremely arbitrary. Conditions (1.a) and (1.b) in Theorem 1 precisely select
those extended uniform rules that satisfy the three desirable conditions. Observe that
consistency of a rule is an invariance property about the shares received by the remaining
agents after a subset of agents leave the problem with their allotment. In contrast, con-
dition (1.b) in Theorem 1 is a sort of consistency requirement on cf that does not impose
any constraint on agentsshares. In particular, (1.b) says that, for any problem (N;; t),
if S  cf (N;; t) then cf

S;S; t 
P
i2cf (N;;t)nS fi (N;; t)

= S:
Theorem 2 characterizes all e¢ cient, consistent, and individually rational from equal
division rules that satisfy independence of irrelevant coalitions as the subclass of extended
uniform rules with the property that they choose the admissible coalition according to a
monotonic order given directly to coalitions (which is not necessarily induced by a unique
order of agents). Formally, let  be a liner order on N ; i.e.,  is a complete, antisymmetric
and transitive binary relation on N . We say that the order  is monotonic if:
(i) for all S 2 N and i =2 S; (S [ fig) S; and
(ii) for all S; T 2 N and i =2 S [ T , ST implies (S [ fig)  (T [ fig) :
Theorem 2 Let f be a rule. Then, f is e¢ cient, consistent, individually rational from
equal division and satises independence of irrelevant coalitions if and only if f is an ex-
tended uniform rule with the property that there exists a monotonic order  on N satisfying
the property that for all (N;; t) 2 P,
(2.a) cf (N;; t) S for all S 2 AC(N;; t)ncf (N;; t):
Proof See Appendix 2.
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Theorem 3 characterizes, for each order  on N, the extended uniform rule F  as the
unique e¢ cient, consistent, and individually rational from equal division rule that satises
order preservation with respect to .
Theorem 3 Let f be a rule and let  be an order. Then, f is e¢ cient, consistent,
individually rational from equal division and satises order priority with respect to  if and
only if f = F .
Proof See Appendix 3.
Since, by Remark 1, order priority with respect to  implies independence of irrelevant
coalitions, it follows that the class of rules characterized in Theorem 3 is a subset of the
class of rules characterized in Theorem 2.
Before nishing this section we want to point out that in each of the three characteri-
zation theorems the set of axioms are independent. See appendices A1.3, A2.2, and A3.2
for the examples showing their independence.
6 Discussion and nal remarks
First, the (large) class of extended uniform rules identied in Theorem 1 satisfy also other
appealing properties.
A rule satises the property of independence of irrelevant agents if at a given problem
an agent either receives the zero share or does not participate then, at the problem where
the agent is not present anymore, all other agents receive the same share they had received
in the original problem. Formally,
(Independence of Irrelevant Agents) A rule f is independent of irrelevant agents
if for each problem (N;N ; t) such that either fi (N;N ; t) = 0 or fi (N;N ; t) = NP for
some agent i 2 N then, fj (N;N ; t) = fj
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig; t

for all j 2 Nnfig.
A rule satises non-bossiness if one agent receives the same share at two problems that
are identical except for the preferences of this agent then, the shares of all the other agents
also coincide at the two problems. Formally,
(Non-bossy) A rule f is non-bossy if for each problem (N;; t), each agent i 2 N ,
and each is preferences 0i such that fi
 
N;
 i;Nnfig ; t = fi  N;  0i;Nnfig ; t then,
fj
 
N;
 i;Nnfig ; t = fj  N;  0i;Nnfig ; t for all j 2 Nn fig :
A rule satises maximality if the set of agents that receive a positive share constitutes
(according to set-wise inclusion) a maximal admissible coalition.
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(Maximality) A rule is maximal if the following holds. Let S be an admissible coalition
for the problem (N;; t) and assume thatPj2S fj (N;; t) = t and 0 < li for all i 2 NnS:
Then, for any T ) S, T is not an admissible coalition for (N;; t):
By condition (1.a) in Theorem 1, all e¢ cient, consistent and individually rational from
equal division rules are maximal. Moreover, Remark 2 below states that non-bossyness
and independence of irrelevant agents follow from consistency.
Remark 2 Let f be a consistent rule. Then, f is independent of irrelevant agents and
non-bossy.
To show that the statement in Remark 2 holds, assume f is consistent. It follows
immediately that f is independent of irrelevant agents. To show that f is non-bossy,
consider a problem (N;N ; t), an agent i 2 N and a preference 0i such that
fi
 
N;
 i;Nnfig ; t = fi  N;  0i;Nnfig ; t : (1)
Since f is consistent, for all j 2 Nnfig,
fj
 
N;
 i;Nnfig ; t = fj  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  fi  N;  i;Nnfig ; t and
fj
 
N;
 0i;Nnfig ; t = fj  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  fi  N;  0i;Nnfig ; t :
By (1), fj
 
N;
 i;Nnfig ; t = fj  N;  0i;Nnfig ; t : Hence, f is non-bossy.
Second, we discuss now why extended uniform rules do not satisfy other appealing
properties.
As we have already discussed, extended uniform rules are not strategy-proof. This
requirement is too demanding because feasible rules have to depend strongly on agents
intervals of participation which makes them extremely vulnerable to manipulations.
There are other reasonable extensions of Sönmez (1994)s individual rationality from
equal division. For instance, when N is an admissible coalition, one could start allocating
the good by preliminary assigning the vector of upper bounds and then decrease uniformly
agentsshares (as long as all lower bounds were satised) until the total amount of the
good would be distributed. This approach would give rise to another set of similar rules.
However, they would be di¤erent than those rules identied in this paper since the two
versions of the axiom are in general incompatible. To see that, consider the problem where
N = f1; 2g, t = 10 and R is any prole with (l1; p1; u1) = (2; 6; 6) and (l2; p2; u2) =
(2; 10; 10): If a rule satises the two versions of the axiom then agent 1 has to receive a
share in the interval [5; 6] and agent 2 a share in [7; 10]; which is unfeasible.13
13See Chun and Thomson (1990), Schummer and Thomson (1997) and Thomson (1994a, 1994b, and
1996) for extensive discussions of the individual rationality requirement in the division problem.
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Thomson (1994a) characterizes the uniform rule in the division problem as the unique
single-valued selection satisfying individual rationality from equal division, e¢ ciency, bi-
lateral consistency and M continuity (a requirement needed to select well-behaved rules
from correspondences). However, it is not possible to replace consistency in our Theorem
1 by bilateral consistency. The reason is that the choice of the admissible coalition can be
made according to bilateral consistency but it may fail to satisfy consistency. For instance,
consider the two rules F 
1
and F 
2
where 1(i) = i for all i 2 N and 2(1) = 2; 2(2) = 1
and 2(j) = j for all j > 2 and dene f as follows. For all (N;; t) 2 P ;
f(N;; t) =
(
F 
1
(N;; t) if #N is odd
F 
2
(N;; t) if #N is even.
It is easy to see that f satises bilateral consistency but it is not consistent.
The non-envy comparison can not be made when agents sets of acceptable shares
are di¤erent. A natural conditional non-envy property would require that if agent is
share belongs to agent js interval of acceptable shares, then agent j should not want to
switch. Nevertheless, extended uniform rules do not satisfy conditional no-envy. To see
that, consider the problem (N;; t) where N = f1; 2g, t = 10, and R is any prole with
(l1; p1; u1) = (2; 10; 10) and (l2; p2; u2) = (0; 10; 10). Any extended uniform rule selects at
this problem the vector (6; 4) where agent 2 conditionally envies agent 1: The di¤erent
lower bounds generates asymmetric shares that make conditional envy possible.
Third, the example used to prove that there is no e¢ cient and anonymous rule ((1.2)
in the proof of Proposition 1) suggests that random rules may be useful to restore the
compatibility of e¢ ciency with fairness properties (like ex-ante equal treatment of equals).
However, this approach would require to extend agents preferences on sure shares to
preferences on random shares. We leave for further research a systematic analysis of
random rules in this setup.
Finally, in some steps in the proofs of the theorems we use proles  where agents
intervals of acceptable shares depend on a small number " > 0 and are degenerated since
for all i 2 N , li = pi = ui. However, we could also choose " > 0 in such a way that for
each i 2 N , i could be characterized by (li; pi; ui) with 0 < li < pi < ui. However, the
case li = pi = ui makes the arguments more transparent.
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Appendix 1. Proof of Theorem 1
A1.1. Preliminaries
We rst introduce the property of bilateral peaks-and-bounds onlyness. It says that for
problems with only two agents at which the set of the two agents is an admissible coalition,
the rule depends only on the peaks and the bounds of the two agentspreferences.
(Bilateral Peaks-and-bounds Only) A rule f is bilateral peaks-and-bounds only if
for any pair of problems (N;; t) and (N;0; t) with jN j = 2; N 2 AC (N;; t) ; and
(li; pi; ui) = (l
0
i; p
0
i; u
0
i) for each i 2 N , then f (N;; t) = f (N;0; t) :
Before proving Theorem 1 we state and prove three lemmata. The proofs of lemmata 1
and 2 adapt to our setting the corresponding proofs of Lemmata 5 and 6 in Dagan (1996).
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Lemma 1 Let f be an e¢ cient and consistent rule that satises individual rationality
from equal division. Then, f satises bilateral peaks-and-bounds onlyness.
Proof Let (N;; t); (N;; t) 2 P be such that N = fi; jg, N = fk;mg; fi; jg \
fk;mg = ?; i=k; j=m, N 2 AC(N;; t), and N 2 AC(N;; t): Dene x =
f(N [ N; (;); 2t): Since N and N are admissible at their respective problems, N [
N 2 AC(N [N; (;); 2t):
In the rest of the proof of this lemma we make an abuse of notation and we take x = 0
when x = NP and x appears in a sum. Thus, xi + xj + xk + xm = 2t. Since f is
consistent,
fi (fi; ; kg ; (i;k) ; 2t  (xj + xm)) = xi and fk (fi; kg ; (i;k) ; 2t  (xj + xm)) = xk:
Since f satises individual rationality from equal division,
fi (fi; kg ; (i;k) ; 2t  (xj + xm)) = fk (fi; kg ; (i;k) ; 2t  (xj + xm)) :
Thus, xi = xk: Similarly, we conclude that xj = xm: Thus, xi + xj = xk + xm = t: By
consistency,
fi (N;; t) = xi = xk = fk (N;; t) and fj (N;; t) = xj = xm = fm (N;; t) : (2)
Now, let 0= ( 0i;0j) be such that (l0i; p0i; u0i) = (li; pi; ui) and (l0j; p0j; u0j) = (lj; pj; uj):
We want to show that f(N;; t) = f(N;0; t): Dene x0 = f(N [N; (0;); 2t): Using
arguments similar to those used above we can conclude that
fi (N;0; t) = x0i = x0k = fk (N;; t) and
fj (N;0; t) = x0j = x0m = fm (N;; t) :
Thus, f(N;; t) = f(N;0; t): 
Lemma 2 Let f be an e¢ cient and consistent rule that satises individual rationality
from equal division and let (fi; jg;; t) 2 P be such that fi; jg is an admissible coalition.
Then, fk (fi; jg;; t) = lk + Fk
 fi; jg;l; t  li   lj for all k 2 fi; jg:
Proof Let (fi; jg;; t) 2 P be such that fi; jg 2 AC (fi; jg;; t). For each k 2 fi; jg;
dene xk = lk+min f; uk   lkg ; where  2 R is such that xi+xj = t (as in the denition
of individual rationality from equal division applied to the problem (fi; jg;; t)). We
distinguish between the two rationing situations.
Consider the case pi + pj  t: Assume rst that xk  pk for all k 2 fi; jg: Since f is
e¢ cient and satises individual rationality from equal division,
fk (fi; jg;; t) = xk = lk + Fk
 fi; jg;l; t  li   lj
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for all k 2 fi; jg:Without loss of generality assume now that xi < pi. Thus, t xi = xj > pj.
By e¢ ciency, fi (fi; jg;; t)  pi > xi: Suppose that fi (N;; t) > pi: We can nd 0i
such that (l0i; p
0
i; u
0
i) = (li; pi; ui) and xi 0i fi (N;; t) : By Lemma 1, fi (fi; jg;; t) =
fi (fi; jg; (0i;j) ; t) : Let x0i = l0i+min f0; u0i   l0ig be as in the denition of individual ra-
tionality from equal division as applied to the problem (fi; jg; (0i;j) ; t) : It is obvious that
x0i = xi: Hence, x
0
i 0i fi (fi; jg; (0i;j) ; t) ; which contradicts that f satises individual
rationality from equal division at the problem (fi; jg; (0i;j) ; t) : Then, fi (fi; jg;; t) =
pi = li+Fi
 fi; jg;l; t  li   lj and hence, fj (fi; jg;; t) = lj+Fj  fi; jg;l; t  li   lj :
A similar argument can be used to show that the desirable statement also holds when
pi + pj > t. 
Lemma 3 Let f be an e¢ cient and consistent rule that satises individual rationality
from equal division. Let (N;; t) be a problem at which N is an admissible coalition.
Then, for each i 2 N; fi (N;; t) = li + Fi

N;l; t Pj2N lj :
Proof Let (N;; t) be an arbitrary problem with N 2 AC(N;; t). We proceed by
induction on jN j : If jN j = 2; the result follows from Lemma 2. Assume jN j > 2 and
suppose that the statement holds for all problems (N 0;0; t0) with jN 0j < jN j and N 0 2
AC(N 0;0; t0): We prove that it also holds for (N;; t): For each i 2 N; dene
gi (N;; t) = li + Fi

N;l; t Pj2N lj :
Since N is admissible, by individual rationality from equal division,
P
j2N fj (N;; t) = t:
To obtain a contradiction, suppose that f (N;; t) 6= g (N;; t) : Then, there exist i; j 2 N
such that
fi (N;; t) > gi (N;; t) and fj (N;; t) < gj (N;; t) : (3)
Without loss of generality, assume that i = 1 and j = 2: Since f is consistent,
fi (N;; t) = fi
 
Nn f1g ;Nnf1g; t  f1 (N;; t)

for all i 2 Nn f1g , and (4)
fk (N;; t) = fk
 
Nn f2g ;Nnf2g; t  f2 (N;; t)

for all k 2 Nn f2g :
In Lemma 5 in the proof of Theorem 1 below we will show (without using this result) that
any extended uniform rule is consistent. Thus,
gi (N;; t) = gi
 
Nn f1g ;Nnf1g; t  g1 (N;; t)

for all i 2 Nn f1g , and (5)
gk (N;; t) = gk
 
Nn f2g ;Nnf2g; t  g2 (N;; t)

for all k 2 Nn f2g .
By the induction hypothesis, for all i 2 Nn f1g ;
fi
 
Nn f1g ;Nnf1g; t  f1 (N;; t)

= gi
 
Nn f1g ;Nnf1g; t  f1 (N;; t)

: (6)
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Since t  f1 (N;; t) < t  g1 (N;; t) ; the denition of g implies that for all i 2 Nn f1g ;
gi
 
Nn f1g ;Nnf1g; t  f1 (N;; t)
  gi  Nn f1g ;Nnf1g; t  g1 (N;; t) : (7)
Hence, by (4), (5), (6), and (7), fi (N;; t)  gi (N;; t) for all i 2 Nn f1g : Analogously,
fk (N;; t)  gk (N;; t) for all k 2 Nn f2g : Thus, fi (N;; t) = gi (N;; t) for all i 2
Nn f1; 2g : Since f and g are consistent, for each i 2 f1; 2g ;
fi (N;; t) = fi

Nn f1; 2g ;Nnf1;2g; t 
P
j2f1;2g fj (N;; t)

; and
gi (N;; t) = gi

Nn f1; 2g ;Nnf1;2g; t 
P
j2f1;2g gj (N;; t)

:
By the induction hypothesis, fi (N;; t) = gi (N;; t) for all i 2 f1; 2g ; a contradiction
with (3). 
A1.2. Proof of the characterization
(=)) Let f be an e¢ cient and consistent rule that satises individual rationality from
equal division. We rst show that f is an extended uniform rule. Let (N;; t) be an
arbitrary problem. By consistency, for each i 2 cf (N;; t) ;
fi (N;; t) = fi
 
cf (N;; t) ;cf (N;;t); t

: (8)
Since cf (N;; t) is admissible at  cf (N;; t) ;cf (N;;t); t and f is e¢ cient, consistent
and satises individual rationality from equal division we deduce, from Lemma 3, that for
all i 2 cf (N;; t) ;
fi
 
cf (N;; t) ;cf (N;;t); t

= li + Fi

cf (N;; t) ;lcf (N;;t); t 
P
j2cf (N;;t) lj

:
Hence, by (8), fi (N;; t) = li + Fi

cf (N;; t) ;l
cf (N;;t); t 
P
j2cf (N;;t) lj

: Moreover,
for each i =2 cf (N;; t) ; fi (N;; t) = NP: Thus, f is an extended uniform rule.
To prove that (1.a) holds, let (N;; t) be a problem at which N is an admissible
coalition and take any i 2 N . By individual rationality from equal division, fi (N;; t) i
li + min f; ui   lig 2 [li; ui] : By denition of cf (N;; t) ; i 2 cf (N;; t) : Since i 2 N
was arbitrary, cf (N;; t) = N . Thus, (1.a) holds.
To prove that (1.b) holds, let (N;; t) be a problem and consider any nonempty S  N:
Since f is consistent, fj (N;; t) = fj

S;S; t 
P
i2cf (N;;t)nS fi (N;; t)

for each j 2 S:
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Now,
cf

S;S; t 
P
i2cf (N;;t)nS fi (N;; t)

=
=
n
j 2 S j fj

S;S; t 
P
i2cf (N;;t)nS fi (N;; t)

2 [lj; uj]
o
= fj 2 S j fj (N;; t) 2 [lj; uj]g
= cf (N;; t) n \ S:
Thus, (1.b) holds.
((=) Assume that f is an extended uniform rule that satises (1.a) and (1.b). We want to
show that f is e¢ cient, consistent and satises individual rationality from equal division.
We do it by proving Lemmata 4 to 8 below.
Lemma 4 The rule F is e¢ cient and consistent on the subdomain of problems (N;; t)
where li = 0 for all i 2 N and N 2 AC(N;; t):
Proof We rst prove that F (N;; t) is Pareto optimal by distinguishing between the
two rationing situations.
Assume rst that
P
j2N pj < t: Then, Fi (N;; t) = min fmax f; pig ; uig for all i 2 N .
Let x = (xi)i2N 2 FA (N;; t) be such that xi i Fi (N;; t) for all i 2 N: It is obvious
that
P
j2N xj = t: We prove that xi = Fi (N;; t) for all i 2 N by distinguishing among
three possible cases.
Case 1: Fi (N;; t) = pi: Since xi i Fi (N;; t) ; xi = pi:
Case 2: Fi (N;; t) = ui. Since xi i Fi (N;; t) ; xi  ui: Suppose that xi < ui: AsP
j2N xj =
P
j2N Fj (N;; t) = t; there exists k 2 N such that xk > Fk (N;; t) : By
its denition, Fk (N;; t) can only take three di¤erent values. If Fk (N;; t) = uk then,
xk > uk which contradicts that x 2 FA (N;; t). If Fk (N;; t) = pk then, xk > pk which
contradicts that xk k Fk (N;; t) : Finally, if Fk (N;; t) =  and pk <  < uk then,  <
xk: Since x 2 FA (N;; t) ; xk  uk; which contradicts, by (P.2), that xk k Fk (N;; t) :
Thus, xi = ui:
Case 3: Fi (N;; t) =  and  > pi (if  = pi; apply Case 1 above). Since xi i
Fi (N;; t) ; xi   by (P.2). Suppose that xi < : As
P
j2N xj =
P
j2N Fj (N;; t) = t;
there exists k 2 N such that xk > Fk (N;; t) : Using arguments similar to those already
used in Case 2 we obtain a contradiction. Thus, xi = :
A similar argument can be used to show that F (N;; t) is Pareto optimal whenP
j2N pj  t (and Fi (N;; t) = min f; pig for all i 2 N).
To prove that F is consistent, it is su¢ cient to show that for all i 2 Nnfkg, Fi (N;; t) =
Fi
 
Nnfkg;Nnfkg; t  fk (N;; t)

for any arbitrary agent k 2 N: Again, we distinguish
between the two rationing situations.
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Assume rst that
P
j2N pj < t: Then, Fi (N;; t) = min fmax f; pig ; uig for all
i 2 N . Thus, pi  Fi (N;; t) for all i 2 N: Let k 2 N: Then,
P
j2Nnfkg pj P
j2Nnfkg Fj (N;; t) : We distinguish between two possible cases.
Case 1:
P
j2Nnfkg pj <
P
j2Nnfkg Fj (N;; t) = t  Fk (N;; t) : SinceP
j2Nnfkgmin fmax f; pjg ; ujg = t  Fk (N;; t) ;
and Fi
 
Nnfkg;Nnfkg; t  Fk (N;; t)

= min fmax f0; pig ; uig where 0 is the unique
number satisfying P
j2Nnfkgmin fmax f0; pjg ; ujg = t  Fk (N;; t) ;
we deduce that  = 0 and, for each i 2 Nnfkg
Fi
 
Nnfkg;Nnfkg; t  Fk (N;; t)

= min fmax f; pig ; uig = Fi (N;; t) :
Case 2:
P
j2Nnfkg pj =
P
j2Nnfkg Fj (N;; t) = t   Fk (N;; t) : Then, by e¢ ciency of F ,
Fi (N;; t) = pi for all i 2 Nnfkg: Moreover, for each i 2 Nnfkg;
Fi
 
Nnfkg;Nnfkg; t  Fk (N;; t)

= min f; pig ;
where  is the unique number satisfyingP
j2Nnfkgmin f; pjg = t  Fk (N;; t) =
P
j2Nnfkg pj:
Thus,  = maxj2Nnfkg fpjg : Hence, for each i 2 Nn fkg ;
Fi
 
Nnfkg;Nnfkg; t  Fk (N;; t)

= pi:
The case
P
j2N pj > t is similar and we omit it. 
Lemma 5 The rule f is consistent.
Proof Let (N;; t) 2 P and S ( N: We have to show that for all i 2 S;
fi (N;; t) = fi

S;S; t 
P
j2cf (N;;t)nS fj (N;; t)

:
It is su¢ cient to prove that it holds for jSj = n   1. Let k 2 N and i 2 Nn fkg : We
distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: i =2 cf (N;; t) : Then, fi (N;; t) = NP: By (1.b), cf
 
Nn fkg ;Nnfkg; t

=
cf (N;; t) n fkg ; where
t =
(
t if k =2 cf (N;; t)
t  fk (N;; t) otherwise.
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Hence, i =2 cf  Nn fkg ;Nnfkg; t and then,
fi
 
Nn fkg ;Nnfkg; t

= NP = fi (N;; t) :
Case 2: i 2 cf (N;; t) : Since by hypothesis f is an extended uniform rule,
fi (N;; t) = li + Fi

cf (N;; t) ;lcf (N;;t); t 
P
j2cf (N;;t) lj

:
By (1.b), i 2 cf  Nn fkg ;Nnfkg; t = cf (N;; t) n fkg : Then,
fi
 
Nn fkg ;Nnfkg; t

=
= li + Fi

cf (N;; t) n fkg ;lcf (N;;t)nfkg; t 
P
j2cf (N;;t)nfkg lj

:
We consider two subcases.
Subcase 2.1: k =2 cf (N;; t) : Then, fk (N;; t) = NP and t = t: Now,
Fi

cf (N;; t) n fkg ;lcf (N;;t)nfkg; t 
P
j2cf (N;;t)nfkg lj

=
= Fi

cf (N;; t) ;lcf (N;;t); t 
P
j2cf (N;;t) lj

:
Hence,
fi
 
Nn fkg ;Nnfkg; t

= fi (N;; t) :
Subcase 2.2: k 2 cf (N;; t) : By Lemma 4, F is consistent on the smaller subdomain.
Thus, setting cf  cf (N;; t) ;
Fi

cf ;lcf ; t 
P
j2cf lj

= Fi

cfn fkg ;lcfnfkg; t 
P
j2cf lj   Fk

cf ;lcf ; t 
P
j2cf lj

:
(9)
Since k 2 cf and f is an extended uniform rule,
 lk   Fk

cf ;lcf ; t 
P
j2cf lj

=  fk (N;; t) : (10)
Now, by (9) and (10),
fi (N;; t) = li + Fi

cf ;lcf ; t 
P
j2cf lj

= Fi

cfn fkg ;lcfnfkg; t 
P
j2cf lj   Fk

cf ;lcf ; t 
P
j2cf lj

= li + Fi

cfn fkg ;lcfnfkg; t 
P
j2cfnfkg lj   fk (N;; t)

= fi
 
Nn fkg ;Nnfkg; t  fk (N;; t)

;
where the last equality follows from the denition of extended uniform rules. 
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Lemma 6 The rule f satises individual rationality from equal division.
Proof Let (N;; t) be such that N is an admissible coalition. By (1.a), cf (N;; t) = N:
Since f is an extended uniform rule,
fi (N;; t) = li + Fi

N;lN ; t 
P
j2N lj

for all i 2 N . We will show that for all i 2 N;
fi (N;; t) i li +min f; ui   lig ;
where
P
j2N min f; uj   ljg = t 
P
j2N lj.
Assume rst that
P
j2N pj < t: Then,
P
j2N (pj   lj) < t  
P
j2N lj: Now, for each
i 2 N;
Fi

N;l; t Pj2N lj = min fmax f; pi   lig ; ui   lig ;
where  is the unique number satisfying
P
j2N min fmax f; pj   ljg ; uj   ljg = t 
P
j2N lj:
Then,    becauseP
j2N min fmax f; pj   ljg ; uj   ljg 
P
j2N min f; uj   ljg = t 
P
j2N lj:
Let i 2 N: We consider separately the following three cases.
Case 1: min fmax f; pi   lig ; ui   lig = pi   li: Then, fi (N;; t) = pi and fi (N;; t) %i
li +min f; ui   lig :
Case 2: min fmax f; pi   lig ; ui   lig = ui   li > pi   li: Then,
min f; ui   lig = ui   li
fi (N;; t) = li + (ui   li) = ui; and
li +min f; ui   lig = ui:
Thus, fi (N;; t) i li +min f; ui   lig :
Case 3: min fmax f; pi   lig ; ui   lig =  > pi   li: We consider two subcases.
Subcase 3.1:   ui   li. Then,
min f; ui   lig = ;
fi (N;; t) = li + ; and
li +min f; ui   lig = li + :
Since li +   li +   pi; by (P.2), fi (N;; t) i li +min f; ui   lig :
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Subcase 3.2:  > ui   li. Then,
min f; ui   lig = ui   li;
fi (N;; t) = li + ; and
li +min f; ui   lig = li + ui   li = ui:
Since pi < li +  = fi (N;; t)  ui; by (P.2), fi (N;; t) i li +min f; ui   lig :
The case
P
j2N pj  t is similar and we omit it. 
Lemma 7 The rule f is e¢ cient.
Proof Suppose not. Then, there exist (N;; t) 2 P, x 2 FA (N;; t) ; and j 2 N
such that xi i fi (N;; t) for all i 2 N and xj j fj (N;; t) : Since xj j fj (N;; t) ;
j 2 S(x) (the set of agents k 2 N such that lk  xk  uk) and hence S(x) 6= ?: Moreover,
cf (N;; t)  S(x). Since S(x) 6= ? is an admissible coalition at (N;; t), cf (N;; t) 6= ?.
Since f satises consistency and cf (N;; t)  S(x), fi
 
S(x);S(x); t

= fi (N;; t)
for all i 2 S(x): By (1:a) ; cf  S(x);S(x); t = S(x): By (1:b) ; cf  S(x);S(x); t =
cf (N;; t) \ S(x): Thus, S(x) = cf (N;; t) : Now (xi   li)i2cf (N;;t) Pareto dominates
Fi

cf (N;; t) ;  ljj2cf (N;;t) ; t Pj2cf (N;;t) lji2cf (N;;t) ;
which contradicts Lemma 4. 
This nishes the proof of the characterization in Theorem 1.
A1.3. Independence of the axioms
Let  : N  ! N be the identity order; i.e.,  (i) = i for all i 2 N:
Consider the rule f 1 dened as follows. Given (N;; t) 2 P ; set cf1 (N;; t) =
cF

(N;; t) and
f 1i (N;; t) =
(
NP if i =2 cf1 (N;; t)
li +min f; ui   lig if i 2 cf1 (N;; t) ;
where  2 R satises Pj2cf1 (N;;t)min f; uj   ljg = t Pj2cf1 (N;;t) lj: It is not di¢ cult
to prove that f 1 is consistent, satises individual rationality from equal division, but it is
not e¢ cient.
Consider the rule f 2 dened as follows. Given (N;; t) 2 P ; set cf2 (N;; t) =
cF

(N;; t) and
f 2i (N;; t) =
(
NP if i =2 cf2 (N;; t)
Di

cf
2
(N;; t) ;cf2 (N;;t); t

if i 2 cf2 (N;; t) ;
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where Di

cf
2
(N;; t) ;cf2 (N;;t); t

denotes the sequential dictatorial rule induced by
the order  in the problem

cf
2
(N;; t) ;cf2 (N;;t); t

: In the sequential dictatorial rule
agents select, following the order , the shares they most prefer, as long as there is enough
amount of the good (we skip its formal denition). It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 2 is
e¢ cient, consistent but it is not individually rational from equal division.
Let 0 : N  ! N be any order di¤erent from : Consider the rule f 3 dened as follows.
First, dene f 1;
0
similarly to f 1 but using order 0 instead of : Now, for all (N;; t) 2 P,
f 3 (N;; t) =
(
f 1 (N;; t) if jN j is odd
f 1;
0
(N;; t) if jN j is even.
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 3 is e¢ cient, satises individual rationality from equal
division but it is not consistent.
Appendix 2. Proof of Theorem 2
A2.1. Proof of the characterization
((=) We rst prove that if f is an extended uniform rule with the property that there
exists a monotonic order  on N such that (2.a) holds then, f is e¢ cient, consistent,
individually rational from equal division and satises independence of irrelevant coalitions.
We do it by proving Lemmata 8 and 9 below.
Lemma 8 The rule f is e¢ cient, consistent and satises individual rationality from
equal division.
Proof By Theorem 1, it is su¢ cient to prove that f satises (1.a) and (1.b). We rst
show that f satises (1.a). Let (N;; t) 2 P be such that N is admissible and let  be the
monotonic order on N associated to f . By property (i) of ; NS for all S ( N: Thus,
cf (N;; t) = N:
Let i 2 N . Using an iterated argument it is su¢ cient to show that f satises (1.b) for
S = Nnfig. Let (N;; t) 2 P. We consider separately the following two cases.
Case 1: i =2 cf (N;; t) : Then, fi (N;; t) = NP: Obviously,
cf (N;; t) 2 AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t
and
AC
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig; t
  AC (N;; t) :
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By (2.a), cf (N;; t) S for all S 2 AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t ncf (N;; t) ; which means that
cf
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig; t

= cf (N;; t)
= cf (N;; t) n fig :
Case 2: i 2 cf (N;; t) : Then, fi (N;; t) 2 [li; ui] : It is easy to see that
S 2 AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  fi (N;; t) implies S [ fig 2 AC (N;; t) : (11)
Moreover, cf (N;; t) n fig 2 AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  fi (N;; t) holds. We prove that 
cf (N;; t) n fig S for all S 2 AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  fi (N;; t) n(cf (N;; t) n fig):
Suppose not; there exists S 0 2 AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  fi (N;; t) such that S 0  cf (N;; t) n fig :
By (11), S 0[fig 2 AC (N;; t) : By property (ii) of , (S 0 [ fig) cf (N;; t) ; which con-
tradicts (2.a). 
Lemma 9 The rule f satises independence of irrelevant coalitions.
Proof Let (N;; t) and (N 0;0; t0) be any two problems with the property thatAC (N 0;0; t0) 
AC (N;; t) and cf (N;; t) 2 AC (N 0;0; t0). By (2.a), for all S 2 AC (N;; t) ncf (N;; t),
cf (N;; t) S holds. Since AC (N 0;0; t0)  AC (N;; t) and cf (N;; t) 2 A (N 0;0; t0) ;
cf (N;; t) S for all S 2 AC (N 0;0; t0) ncf (N;; t) : By (2.a), cf (N 0;0; t0) = cf (N;; t) :

(=)) Let f be an e¢ cient and consistent rule that satises individual rationality from
equal division and independent of irrelevant coalitions. By Theorem 1, f is an extended
uniform rule. We want to show that there exists a monotonic order  on N such that f
satises (2.a).
We rst dene (using f) a binary relation  on N . Let S; S 0 2 N . Three cases are
possible.
Case 1: S  S 0. Then, set SS 0:
Case 2: S 0  S. Then, set S 0S:
Case 3: There exist agents j 2 SnS 0 and j0 2 S 0nS: Consider any problem (N;; t) where
S; S 0  N and for each i 2 N; li = pi = ui; and
pi =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
" if i 2 S \ S 0
"2 if i 2 Sn (S 0 [ fjg)
t  " jS \ S 0j   "2 jSn (S 0 [ fjg)j if i = j
"3 if i 2 S 0n (S [ fj0g)
t  " jS \ S 0j   "3 jS 0n (S [ fj0g)j if i = j0
"4 if i 2 Nn (S [ S 0) :
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Moreover, we choose " > 0 small enough to make sure that 0 < pi < t for all i 2 N and
AC (N;; t) = f?; S; S 0g : Observe that such " > 0 exists. Thus, cf (N;; t) 2 fS; S 0g:
Then, if cf (N;; t) = S set SS 0 and if cf (N;; t) = S 0 set S 0S:
Since f satises independence of irrelevant coalitions,  does not depend on (N;; t) :
Namely, let (N 0;0; t0) be such that AC (N 0;0; t0) = f?; S; S 0g : Then, cf (N 0;0; t0) =
cf (N;; t) : Thus,  is well dened.
Lemma 10 If SS 0 and T  S \ S 0 then, (SnT )  (S 0nT ) :
Proof If S  S 0 then, the statement follows immediately. Assume SnS 0 6= ? and S 0nS 6=
? hold. Let i 2 T  S \ S 0 and (N;; t) be a problem as in the denition of  applied to
S and S 0. Thus, AC (N;; t) = f?; S; S 0g ; cf (N;; t) = S and AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t =
f?; Sn fig ; S 0n figg ; where again,
t =
(
t if k =2 cf (N;; t)
t  fk (N;; t) otherwise.
Since f satises (1.b),
cf
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig; t

= cf (N;; t) n fig = Sn fig :
Let (N;0; t) be as in the denition of  applied to Sn fig and S 0n fig : Thus,
AC (N;0; t) = f?; Sn fig ; S 0n figg = AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t :
Since f satises independence of irrelevant coalitions and cf
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig; t

= Sn fig ;
cf (N;0; t) = Sn fig : Thus, (Sn fig)  (S 0n fig) : Repeating successively the same argu-
ment for each agent in Tn fig it follows that (SnT )  (S 0nT ) : 
Lemma 11 The binary relation  on N is complete, antisymmetric, and satises prop-
erties (i) and (ii) :
Proof By denition,  is a complete and antisymmetric binary relation. Property (i)
holds trivially. Suppose that  does not satisfy property (ii) : Then, there exist S; T  N
and i 2 Nn (S [ T ) such that ST but (S [ fig)  (T [ fig) does not hold. Since  is
complete, (T [ fig)  (S [ fig). By Lemma 10, TS; which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 12 The rule f satises (2.a).
Proof Let S 2 AC (N;; t) ncf (N;; t) : We want to prove that cf (N;; t) S: We
distinguish among the following three cases.
Case 1: S ( cf (N;; t) : Then cf (N;; t) S by denition of .
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Case 2: cf (N;; t) ( S: We will obtain a contradiction. Consider the problem (S;S; t) :
Since S 2 AC(N;; t), S 2 AC (S;S; t) : By Theorem 1, f satises (1.a). Thus,
cf (S;S; t) = S: Since cf (N;; t) ( S; cf (N;; t) 2 AC (S;S; t) :Moreover, AC (S;S; t) 
AC (N;; t) : Since f satises independence of irrelevant coalitions, cf (S;S; t) = cf (N;; t) ;
a contradiction with cf (S;S; t) = S:
Case 3: cf (N;; t) nS 6= ? and Sncf (N;; t) 6= ?. Let (N;0; t0) be as in the denition
of  applied to the sets cf (N;; t) and S: Thus, AC (N;0; t0) = cf (N;; t) ; S	 : Since f
satises independence of irrelevant coalitions, cf (N;0; t0) = cf (N;; t) : By the denition
of ; cf (N;; t) S: 
Lemma 13 below states that  is transitive, the only remaining property to be proven
in order to nish the proof of the characterization of Theorem 2.
Lemma 13 The binary relation  on N is transitive.
Proof To simplify the notation, given a family fX1; X2; :::; XKg of subsets of N; we
denote [Kk=1Xk by X1X2:::XK : Assume that SS 0 and S 0S 00: We must prove that SS 00:
We decompose S; S 0, and S 00 according to Figure 2, with S = ABCG; S 0 = CDEG and
S 00 = AEFG; and prove Claims 1 to 5 below.
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Figure 2
Claim 1 Assume that AC (N;; t) = fXkgKk=1 and for each k 6= 1; there exists jk such
that XjkXk: Then, X1Xk for each k 6= 1:
Proof Since AC (N;; t) 6= ?, we have that cf (N;; t) 2 AC (N;; t) : Let k 6= 1 and
assume XjkXk: Since f satises (2.a), c
f (N;; t) 6= Xk: Thus, cf (N;; t) = X1: Since f
satises (2.a), X1Xk for each k 6= 1: 
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Claim 2 Assume that B 6= ?; D 6= ?; and F 6= ?: Then, SS 00:
Proof By assumption, for each X 2 fB;D; Fg ; we can nd iX 2 X: Consider any
problem (N;; 1) where BDF  N and for all i 2 N; li = pi = ui and
pi =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
" if i 2 G
"2 if i 2 C
"3 if i 2 A
"4 if i 2 E
"5 if i 2 Bn fiBg
1  " jGj   "2 jCj   "3 jAj   "5 jBn fiBgj if i = iB
"6 if i 2 Dn fiDg
1  " jGj   "2 jCj   "4 jEj   "6 jDn fiDgj if i = iD
"7 if i 2 Fn fiFg
1  " jGj   "2 jCj   "4 jEj   "7 jFn fiFgj if i = iF
2 otherwise.
For " > 0 su¢ ciently small, AC (N;; 1) = f?; S; S 0; S 00g : By Claim 1, cf (N;; 1) = S:
Since f satises (2.a), SS 00: 
Claim 3 Let U;U 0; V; V 0 be such that X \ Y = ? for each X;Y 2 fU;U 0; V; V 0g with
X 6= Y and assume UU 0 and V V 0: Then, UV U 0V 0:
Proof Since UU 0 and V V 0, U 6= ? and V 6= ? hold. We consider four cases separately.
Case 1: U 0 = V 0 = ?: Obviously, UV ?:
Case 2: U 0 6= ? and V 0 6= ?: For each X 2 fU;U 0; V; V 0g ; take iX 2 X. Consider any
problem (N;; 3) where UU 0V V 0  N; and for all i 2 N , li = pi = ui and
pi =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
" if i 2 Un fiUg
2  " jUn fiUgj if i = iU
"2 if i 2 U 0n fiU 0g
2  "2 jU 0n fiU 0gj if i = iU 0
"3 if i 2 V n fiV g
1  "3 jV n fiV gj if i = iV
"4 if i 2 V 0n fiV 0g
1  "4 jV 0n fiV 0gj if i = iV 0
4 otherwise.
It is easy to see that, for " > 0 is su¢ ciently small, AC (N;; 3) = f?; UV; UV 0; U 0V; U 0V 0g :
Since UU 0 and, by Lemma 11,  satises property (ii) ; UV U 0V and UV 0U 0V 0: Since
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V V 0, and again by property (ii), UV UV 0: Claim 1 implies UV U 0V 0:
Case 3: U 0 6= ? and V 0 = ?: For each X 2 fU;U 0; V g ; take iX 2 X. Consider any
problem (N;; 1) where UU 0V  N for all i 2 Nn fiUg ; li = pi = ui; and for " > 0 small
enough,
pi =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
" if i 2 Un fiUg
"2 if i 2 U 0n fiU 0g
1  "2 jU 0n fiU 0gj if i = iU 0
"3 if i 2 V
4 otherwise,
and liU = 1   " jUn fiUgj   "3 jV j and uiU = 1   " jUn fiUgj : Now, AC (N;; 1) = U 0 [
fX j U  X  UV g : Since UU 0 and UV X for each X 2 AC (N;; 1) n fUV;U 0g ; by
Claim 1, UV U 0:
Case 4: U 0 = ? and V 0 6= ?: Since the argument is symmetric to the previous case, we
omit it. 
Claim 4 Let U; V be such that U \ V = ? and UV: Then, for each X  V; UX:
Proof If X = ?, then UX follows from property (i) of . Assume X 6= ? and take
iX 2 X and iU 2 U: Consider any problem (N;; 1) with UV  N and for all i 2 Nn fiXg ;
li = pi = ui and for " > 0 small enough,
pi =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
" if i 2 Un fiUg
1  " jUn fiUgj if i = iU
"2 if i 2 Xn fiXg
"3 if i 2 V nX
4 otherwise,
and liX = 1   "2 jXn fiXgj   "3 jV nXj and uiX = 1   "2 jXn fiXgj : Now AC (N;; 1) =
f?; U [ fY j X  Y  V gg : Since UV and V Y for each Y 2 A (N;; 1) n fV; Ug we
conclude; by Claim 1, that UX: 
Claim 5 Assume that for each X;Y 2 fA;B;C;D;E; Fg ; X \ Y = ?; ABDE; and
CDAF: Then, ABCDDEAF:
Proof We rst prove that if B 6= ?; D 6= ?; and F 6= ?; then ABCDDEAF: Let S =
ABC; S 0 = CDE; and S 00 = AEF: Since ABDE; CDAF; and  satises property (ii) ;
S = ABCCDE = S 0 and S 0 = CDEAEF = S 00: By Claim 2, S = ABCAEF = S 00:
By Lemma 10, BCEF: By property (ii) of ; ABCDDEAF:
We now prove that if C 6= ?; A 6= ?; and E 6= ?; then ABCDDEAF: Let S = BCD;
S 0 = ABF; and S 00 = DEF: Since ABDE; CDAF; and  satises property (ii) ; S 0 =
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ABFDEF = S 00 and S = BABF = S 0: By Claim 2, S = CDBDEF = S 00: By Lemma
10, BCEF: By property (ii) of ; ABCDDEAF:
We proceed by considering several cases:
Case 1: A = ?; D = ?: Thus, BE and CF . Then, BCEF follows from Claim 3 and
hence ABCDDEAF .
Case 2: A = ?; D 6= ?: Thus, BDE and CDF: Since BDE; B 6= ?: We consider two
subcases.
Subcase 2.1: F 6= ?: Since B 6= ?; D 6= ?; and F 6= ?; ABCDDEAF holds.
Subcase 2.2: F = ?: Thus, BDE and CD: By property (ii) of ; it is su¢ cient to to
prove that BCE: Since BDE; by Claim 4, BE: Since C? and Claim 3 holds, BCE:
Thus, ABCDDEAF:
Case 3: A 6= ?; D = ?: It is symmetric to Case 2.
Case 4: A 6= ?; D 6= ?: We consider three subcases.
Subcase 4.1: B 6= ?; F 6= ?: Since B 6= ?; D 6= ?; and F 6= ?, ABCDDEAF holds.
Subcase 4.2: B 6= ?; F = ?: Thus, ABDE and CDA: By property (ii) of ; it is
su¢ cient to to prove that BE: First, if E = ? it holds trivially. Second, assume E 6= ?
and C 6= ? hold. Then, and since C 6= ?; A 6= ?; and E 6= ?; ABCDDEAF holds.
Finally, assume E 6= ? and C = ? hold. Suppose EB: By Claim 3, DEAB; which
contradicts that ABDE:
Subcase 4.3: B = ?: Thus, ADE and CDAF: We rst prove that C 6= ?: Suppose
not. Then, DAF: By Claim 4, DA: Since ADE; and by Claim 4 again, AD; which
contradicts the antisymmetry of . Hence, C 6= ?. First, assume E = ?: Thus, AD and
CDAF: By property (ii) of ; it is su¢ cient to to prove that CF: Suppose not. Then,
FC: Since AD and Claim 3, FACD; which contradicts that  is antisymmetric and
CDAF: Second, assume E 6= ?: Since C 6= ?; A 6= ?; and E 6= ?; ABCDDEAF
holds. 
To conclude with the proof of Lemma 13, assume SS 0 and S 0S 00: We want to show
that SS 00 holds. Since SS 0; ABCGCDEG (see Figure 2). By Lemma 10, ABDE:
Since S 0S 00; CDEGAEFG: By Lemma 10, CDAF: By Claim 5, ABCDDEAF: By
Lemma 10, BCEF: By property (ii) of ; S = BCAGEFAG = S 00: 
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A2.2. The independence of the axioms
Let  be such that  (i) = i for all i 2 N: Given S; T 2 N dene 1S;S[T 2 RS[T as follows:
1S;S[Ti =
(
1 if i 2 S
0 if i =2 S:
Dene 1T;S[T analogously. We dene the order  on N . For any S; T 2 N , S 6= T , set ST
if and only if 1S;S[T is strictly larger, according to the lexicographic order, than 1T;S[T :
Now, it is easy to see that for any problem (N;; t) ; cF (N;; t) 2 AC (N;; t) and
cF

(N;; t) S for all S 2 AC (N;; t) ncF (N;; t) : It is not di¢ cult to prove that, as
dened in A1.3 of Appendix 1,
(1) f 1 is consistent, individually rational from equal division and satises independence of
irrelevant coalitions but it is not e¢ cient;
(2) f 2 is e¢ cient, consistent and satises independence of irrelevant coalitions but it is not
individually rational from equal division; and
(3) f 3 is e¢ cient and individually rational from equal division and satises independence
of irrelevant coalitions but it is not consistent.
We dene f 4 as follows. Let 0 be the order in which agent 1 is always the last and the
other agents are ordered as in : Now, for all (N;; t) 2 P,
f 4 (N;; t) =
(
F 
0
(N;; t) if 1 2 N and p1 = 1
F  (N;; t) otherwise.
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 4 is e¢ cient, consistent, individually rational from equal
division but it does not independence of irrelevant coalitions.
Appendix 3. Proof of Theorem 3
A3.1. Proof of the characterization
((=) Let  : N  ! N be an order. We rst prove that the extended uniform rule F 
is e¢ cient, consistent, individually rational from equal division and satises order priority
with respect to . We do it in Lemmata 14 and 15 below. In order to simplify the notation,
assume  (i) = i for all i 2 N.
Lemma 14 The extended uniform rule F  is e¢ cient, consistent and individually ratio-
nal from equal division.
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Proof By Theorem 1, it is su¢ cient to prove that F  satises (1.a) and (1.b). By its
denition, F  satises (1.a). To show that F  also satises (1.b), consider any problem
(N;; t) and let i 2 N be arbitrary. For each 1  j  n  1; let X 0j denote the sets Xj as
in the denition of F  when the procedure is applied to the problem
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig;bt ;
where bt = ( t if F i (N;; t) = NP
t  F i (N;; t) otherwise.
We will prove that
cF

(N;; t) n fig 2 X 0j for all 1  j  n  1: (12)
Observe that (1.b) would follow because (12) and jX 0n 1j = 1 imply that cF (N;; t) n fig =
X 0n 1 and hence, cF
  
Nn fig ;Nnfig;bt = cF (N;; t) n fig. To prove (12) we consider
separately two cases.
Case 1: F i (N;; t) 2 [li; ui] : Thus, i 2 cf (N;; t) : We rst mention two statements:
(s1) Let S 2 AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  F i (N;; t) : Then, Pj2S lj  t   F i (N;; t) P
j2S uj: Hence,
P
j2S[fig lj  t 
P
j2S[fig uj: Namely, S [ fig 2 AC (N;; t) :
(s2) Let S 2 AC (N;; t) be such that i 2 S and there exists (xj)j2S 2 FA (S;S; t) such
that xi = F i (N;; t) : Thus, Sn fig 2 AC
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  F i (N;; t)

:
Since cF

(N;; t) 2 X0  AC (N;; t) and (s2) holds,
cF

(N;; t) n fig 2 X 00 = AC  Nn fig ;Nnfig; t  F i (N;; t) :
We now prove that cF

(N;; t) n fig 2 X 0j for all 1  j  n  1: We do it for j = 1; the
rst step of the procedure (the other steps are similar and we omit them). We consider
two subcases.
Subcase 1.1: For each S 2 X0; 1 =2 S: Then X1 = X0: Suppose that 1 2 S for some
S 2 X 00: By (s1) ; S [ fig 2 X0; which is a contradiction. Then, for each S 2 X 00; 1 =2 S:
Hence X 01 = X 00 and cF

(N;; t) n fig 2 X 01:
Subcase 1.2: There exists S 2 X0 such that 1 2 S: Then, X1 = fS 2 X0j1 2 Sg : Again,
we consider two subcases.
Subcase 1.2.1: i 6= 1: Since cF (N;; t) 2 X1; by (s2) ; 1 2 cF (N;; t) n fig 2 X 00: Now
X 01 = fS 2 X 00j1 2 Sg and hence cF (N;; t) n fig 2 X 01:
Subcase 1.2.2: i = 1: In this case we can not compute X 01: After X 00 we must compute
X 02: We prove that cf (N;; t) n fig 2 X 02: We again consider two subcases.
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Subcase 1.2.2.1: For each S 2 X1; 2 =2 S: Then X2 = X1: Suppose that 2 2 S for some
S 2 X 00: By (s1) ; S [ f1g 2 X0; which is a contradiction. Then, for each S 2 X 00; 2 =2 S:
Hence X 02 = X 00 and cF

(N;; t) n f1g 2 X 02:
Subcase 1.2.2.2: There exists S 2 X1 such that 2 2 S: Then X2 = fS 2 X2j2 2 Sg : Since
cF

(N;; t) 2 X2; by (s2) ; 2 2 cF (N;; t) n f1g 2 X 00: Now X 02 = fS 2 X 00j2 2 Sg and
hence cF

(N;; t) n f1g 2 X 02:
Case 2: F i (N;; t) =2 [li; ui] : Then, F i (N;; t) = NP and i =2 cf (N;; t) : It is easy to
see that AC
 
Nn fig ;Nnfig; t

= fS 2 AC (N;; t) j i =2 Sg : Hence, cF (N;; t) 2 X 00.
Using arguments similar to those used in Case 1, we can prove that cF

(N;; t) 2 X 0j for
all 1  j  n  1: 
Lemma 15 The extended uniform rule F  satises order priority with respect to :
Proof Let i 2 N be such that i =2 cF (N;; t) and cF (N;; t)\fi+ 1; :::; ng 6= ?:We
must prove that there is no admissible coalition containing f1; :::; ig\ cF (N;; t) : To ob-
tain a contradiction, let S be an admissible coalition containing f1; :::; ig\cF (N;; t) : Let
j 2 N: If there exists S 0 2 Xj 1 such that j 2 S 0, then Xj = fT 2 Xj 1 j j 2 Tg : Since,
cF

(N;; t) = Xn  Xj; j 2 cF (N;; t) : Thus, if j =2 cF (N;; t) ; fT 2 Xj 1 j j 2 Tg =
? and Xj = Xj 1:We now prove that S 2 Xj for all 1  j  i:We prove it by induction.
First, S 2 X0 holds and let 1  j  i. Assume that S 2 Xj 1:We prove that S 2 Xj:We
distinguish between two possible cases.
Case 1: j =2 cF (N;; t) : Thus, Xj = Xj 1, which means that S 2 Xj:
Case 2: j 2 cF (N;; t) : Thus, Xj = fT 2 Xj 1 j j 2 Tg and S 2 Xj because f1; :::; ig\
cF

(N;; t)  S:
Thus, i 2 S 2 X i; which means that i 2 cF (N;; t) : But this contradicts the initial
assumption that i =2 cF (N;; t). 
(=)) Let f be an e¢ cient and consistent rule that satises individual rationality from equal
division and order priority with respect to : By Theorem 1, f is an extended uniform
rule. Lemma 16 below nishes with the proof of the characterization in Theorem 3.
Lemma 16 Let (N;; t) be a problem. Then, cf (N;; t) = cF (N;; t) :
Proof By denition of F , cF (N;; t) = Xn: We now prove that if f satises order
priority with respect to , then cf (N;; t) = Xn. We show that for each i 2 N , i 2
cf (N;; t) if and only if i 2 Xn. Assume, without loss of generality, that (i) = i for all
i 2 N. We proceed by induction on the index of the agents. If there exists an admissible
coalition S such that 1 2 S; then X1 = fS 2 AC (N;; t) j 1 2 Sg : In this case 1 2 Xn
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because Xn  X1: If there does not exist an admissible coalition S such that 1 2 S; then
X1 = AC (N;; t) : In this case, 1 =2 Xn: Since f satises order priority with respect to ;
it is easy to see that 1 2 cf (N;; t) if and only if there exists an admissible coalition S
such that 1 2 S:
Assume that for all j < i  n; j 2 cf (N;; t) if and only if j 2 Xn: We prove that
i 2 cf (N;; t) if and only if i 2 Xn: Using arguments similar to those used with agent
1 we can prove that i 2 Xn if and only if there exists an admissible coalition S 2 X i 1
such that i 2 S:We now prove that i 2 cf (N;; t) if and only if there exists an admissible
coalition S 2 X i 1 such that i 2 S.
Assume i 2 cf (N;; t) and let S = cf (N;; t) : By denition, cf (N;; t) is admis-
sible. By induction hypothesis, f1; :::; i  1g \ cf (N;; t) = f1; :::; i  1g \ Xn: Thus,
cf (N;; t) 2 X i 1:
Assume that there exists an admissible coalition S 2 X i 1 such that i 2 S. By
induction hypothesis, f1; :::; i  1g\cf (N;; t) = f1; :::; i  1g\Xn: Since f1; :::; ig\Xn 
S, S is an admissible coalition containing f1; :::; ig \ cf (N;; t) : Since f satises order
priority with respect to , i 2 cf (N;; t) : 
A3.2. The independence of the axioms
Assume, by simplicity, that  (i) = i for all i 2 N: We dene f 5 as follows. Given S 2
AC (N;; t), dene IDi (S;; t) as the share obtained by i when agents select sequentially,
following the order , the share they prefer most corresponding to feasible and individually
rational from equal division allocations (we avoid the technical denition). Given (N;; t) ;
set cf
5
(N;; t) = cF (N;; t) and f 5i (N;; t) = NP for each i =2 cf5 (N;; t) and for
each i 2 cf5 (N;; t),
f 5i (N;; t) =
(
F i
 
cF

(N;; t) ;cF (N;;t); t

if
cF (N;; t) is odd
IDi
 
cF

(N;; t) ;cF (N;;t); t

if
cF (N;; t) is even.
It is not di¢ cult to show that:
(1) The rule f 1 is consistent, individually rational from equal division and satises order
priority with respect to ; but it is not e¢ cient.
(2) The rule f 2 is e¢ cient, consistent and satises order priority with respect to ; but it
is not individually rational from equal division.
(3) Any extended uniform rule F 
0
with 0 6=  is e¢ cient, consistent and individually
rational from equal division, but it does not satisfy order priority with respect to :
39
(4) The rule f 5 is e¢ cient, individually rational from equal division and satises order
priority with respect to , but it is not consistent.
40
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